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New Health Practitioner Liability and Standard of Care: A Prediction
I. INTRODUCTION
As an answer to the increased demand' for primary care' throughout
the nation, a new kind of health care provider emerged in the late six-
ties.3 Often referred to as "physician extenders" 4 or "new health pro-
fessionals,"5 these physician's assistants and nurse practitioners provide
diagnostic and therapeutic treatment for patients6 who do not other-
wise have access to primary care. A physician's assistant is defined by
the American Medical Association as "a skilled person qualified by ac-
ademic and practical training to provide patient services under the su-
pervision and direction of a licensed physician who is responsible for
the performance of that assistant."'' A physician's assistant's training
requirements vary slightly from state to state. Prerequisites to entrance
in a training program differ from high school diploma to two years of
college level course work. Some states also prefer two to three years of
health related work.8 Once enrolled in a state Board of Education ac-
credited training program, the physician's assistant candidate studies
traditional liberal arts courses, along with non-traditional academic
courses focusing on clinical (applied) medicine.9 Graduates of accred-
ited educational programs are then employable as physician's assistants
under the direct supervision of a physician or institution.
i. C. FUCH, WHO SHALL LIVE? (1974) and Scheffier, Physicians and New Health Profession-
als-Issuesfor the 1980"s, INQUIRY, Fall 1979, write that although there is not a doctor shortage,
there is a maldistribution of doctors with deficits in rural, inner city, and other poor areas. This
maldistribution causes the demand for new primary care distributors.
2. Primary care is "initial access" and "overall management" care of a patient. See P.
DEDMAN, ALLIED HEALTH EDUCATION DIRECTORY 370 (7th ed. 1977). Examples of primary care
include receiving patients, performing or assisting in laboratory procedures, giving injections, su-
turing wounds, performing general physical examinations and counseling service. Id.
3. Chapman & Record, Defensibility of New Health Professionals at Law: A Speculative Pa-
per, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 30, 30 (1979).
4. Id
5. This is the more common term of art used to categorize phyisician's assistants and nurse
practitioners.
6. These patients reside in the traditional physician deficient areas. The areas include rural
areas and urban poor areas. See Rural Health Clinic Services Act of 1977 § I, 42 U.S.C. § 1395
(1976) [hereinafter cited as RHCSA]. Deficient areas also include state mental health or prison
institutions. See Ramos v. Lamy, 639 F.2d 559, 577 (10th Cir. 1980).
7. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH MANPOWER, DIVISION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, AMERI-
CAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT AND USE OF PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANTS 5 (1973)(em-
phasis added).
8. See P. DEDMAN supra note 2, at 370.
9. Id
1
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A nurse practitioner is a licensed registered nurse with further special
training. To prepare for licensure as a registered nurse, a student can
attend "one of three types of nursing educational programs: diploma,
associate degree, and baccalaureate."'" A nursing diploma can be re-
ceived after completion of a hospital based program, which is usually
three years in duration." "Basic nursing education provided in a 2
year community college leads to an associate degree in nursing, and
that provided through a 3 year collegiate program results in a bache-
lor's degree in nursing."' 2 Once licensed to practice as a registered
nurse, an individual is eligible to become a nurse practitioner upon
completion of specialized training in a state Board of Education nurse
practitioner training program.
These two types of health professionals do not share statutory au-
thorization to practice.' 3 Their respective practices are governed by
different statutes and are regulated by different bodies.'4 As a result,
physician's assistants practice as agents of their supervisory physician
or institution,' 5 while nurse practitioners practice either as agents of a
hiring institution or physician or as independent contractors.' 6
To help dispense primary care most effectively the new health pro-
fessionals should perform in expanded autonomous practice,' 7 espe-
cially in the physician deficient areas.'8 But before the new health
professional can become a main source of primary care, either as an
10. FACTS ABOUT NURSING 127 (1981).
11. Id
12. Id
13. Washington State Nurses Ass'n v. Board of Medical Examiners, 93 Wash. 2d 117, 119,
605 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1980).
14. For a discussion of model physician's assistant authorization legislation, see Comment,
The Physician "sAssistant in Michigan: A Second Look at Expanded Medical Delegation, 1978 DET.
C.L. REV. 45, 57 (1978); See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.371 (Supp. 1983), which dele-
gates authority for physician's assistants to practice through a supervising physician and Physi-
cian's Assistant Committee (Committee). See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2513 (West Supp.
1984). The Committee approves supervision of a physician's assistant practice so that "they exer-
cise no independent authority." Washington State Nurses Ass'n v. Board of Medical Examiners,
93 Wash. 2d at 118, 605 P.2d at 1271.
Nurse practitioner authorization comes from state registered nurse statutes. See, e.g., CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 2700-2825 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984).
Registered nurses can practice as nurse practitioners after completing a state-approved nurse
practitioner training program. Nurse practitioners are regulated by the American Nursing Associ-
ation (ANA).
15. Hospitals and medical clinics are the institutions where new health professionals work.
16. Eg., Lane, Promoting an Independent Nurse Practice, 75 AM. J. NURSING 1319 (1975);
Goodspeed, The Independent Practitioner-Can it Survive?, 14 J. PSYCHIATRIC NURSING &
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 33 (1976). The nurse practitioner must still have limited physician
contact. A hotline to a physician's office is often sufficient.
17. See generally Golliday, Miller, & Smith, Allied Health Manpower Strategies: Estimates of
the Potential Gains from Efficient Task Delegation, 6 MED. CARE 457 (1973); Rivara, Impact of the
Rural Health Clinics Services Bill, A Projection, 6 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 103 (1980).
18. See generally RHCSA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976).
2
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agent of a hospital or physician or as an independent contractor, his
liability in malpractice causes of action must be established. In an age
in which professional malpractice suits are the norm,' 9 it is necessary to
take a close look at new health professional liability before determining
to what extent new health professionals can practice. "The future of
physician's assistants and nurse practitioners will be shaped at least in
part by whether, and on what terms, they are defensible at law."2
In an effort to aid future policy decisions on new health professional
practice, this Comment addresses two issues. First, it must be deter-
mined who will be held liable for the malpractice of the new health
professional. Will it be the new health professional himself, or, if the
new health professional is an agent of the supervising physician or in-
stitution, will the supervisor be held liable under the doctrine of respon-
deaf superior?
Once the liability question is discussed, this Comment examines
what standard of care2" the new health professional should be held to
in a negligence cause of action. Presently, there is no clear standard of
care established for these new health professionals.2"
In developing a standard of care for the new health professionals,
this Comment reaches three conclusions. First, boundaries for the
standard of care must be established. The standard of care must be less
than that of a physician, but high enough to ensure adequate patient
primary care. The next conclusion concerns the choice between a na-
tional or similar community standard of care. The modem trend in
medical malpractice suits is to hold the negligent health care provider
to a national standard of care. This Comment proposes the following
of the modern trend. Finally, this Comment discusses how flexible the
national standard of care should be. To ensure its fair application, the
standard of care should be flexible enough to accomodate the different
levels and methods of care exercised by these diversely practicing phy-
sician's assistants and nurse practitioners.
19. See generally Keeton, Professional Malpractice, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 445 (1978).
20. Chapman & Record, supra note 3, at 30.
21. A standard of care implicitly defines the duty owed by one to the people with whom he
associates. The proposed new health professional standard of care is defined in terms of exercis-
ing the skill and knowledge acquired by the properly trained new health professional. It is hard to
equate the skill and knowledge acquired by the new health professional with a duty owed by him
to the primary care patient. Courts have answered this problem by holding the new health profes-
sional to an ordinary reasonable person standard in exercising this skill and knowledge. See
Thompson v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 466 (1973).
22. Comment, Nurse Practitioner-Here Today Gone Tomorrow?, 6 NovA L. J. 365, 381
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Nurse Practitioner]; Comment, Medico-Legal Implications of
Recent Legislation Concerning Allied Health Practitioners, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 379 (1978).
3
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II. NEW HEALTH PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
A. The Threshold Question
The threshold question in determining liability for new health pro-
fessional malpractice is whether the new health professional in dispens-
ing primary care is acting autonomously as an independent contractor
or as an agent of either an institution or physician. If the new health
professional is acting autonomously,23 he will be liable for his own neg-
ligence. If there is no agency relationship, then there is no supervisor
to be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The negligent
actor must be accountable for his own negligence. If, on the other
hand, there is an agency relationship, both the agent new health profes-
sional and his principal supervisor, a hospital or physician, may be
joined as defendants in a suit for alleged agent malpractice.24 The
principal may be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior.25 This does not "exonerate the agent from liability."2 6 He may
still be liable for his own tort2 7 and may have to pay the plaintiffs
damage award 8 or later indemnify his employer 9 who has paid the
plaintiff this sum.
B. Determinantsfor Answering the Threshold Question
Three factors aid in the determination of the new health professional
liability question. The first factor is the legislative intent of state new
health professional authorization statutes. The legislatures, in author-
izing new health professionals to practice, intended to set parameters
30
for new health professional's practice. A statute that does not allow for
autonomous practice will force the new health professional to practice
under an agency relationship with a physician or institution,3' while a
broad delegatory statute may allow for autonomous new health profes-
sional practice.
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 175 Cal. Rptr.
177 (1981); Truhitte v. French Hosp., 128 Cal. App. 3d 332, 180 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1982); Washington
State Nurses Ass'n v. Board of Medical Examiners, 93 Wash. 2d 117, 605 P.2d 1269 (1980).
25. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
26. Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 787, 127 P. 50, 52 (1912). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 343, 344-351 (1958).
27. See Bayuk v. Edson, 236 Cal. App. 2d 309, 320, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49, 56 (1965).
28. REPORT OF THE SECRETARIES COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DHEW Pub.
No. (05)) 73-79 app. (1973).
29. Id.
30. Parameters for practice are set by delegatory and regulatory legislation. See Comment,
supra note 14, at 57-72.
3 1. Virtually all physician's assistant authorization statutes are this type. See generally id. at
47.
4
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There are generally two types of authorization statutes.32 Simple au-
thorization statutes require the new health professional to be an em-
ployee (an agent) of a supervising (and thus regulating) physician or
institution. Regulatory statutes, on the other hand, require a regulatory
agency33 to define the scope of new health professional liability. Under
a regulatory statute34 a new health professional may be accorded in-
dependent prescriptive authority.35 With this granted authority a "sub-
stantial number of nurse practitioners . . .have been experimenting
with solo or group practices in which they are self-employed."36 This is
especially true in the rural areas where nurse practitioners are en-
couraged to operate autonomously under the Rural Health Clinic Serv-
ices Act (RHCSA).37 Here the nurse practitioner will be independently
liable for any negligence.
Nurse practitioner authorization statutes may instead be simple au-
thorization statutes.38 Virtually all physician's assistant authorization
32. See Kissam, Physician's Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Laws:. A Study of Health Law
Reform, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1975); See also Comment, Nurse Practitioner, supra note 22, at
370.
33. These regulatory agencies are typically the state Board of Medicine for physician's assist-
ants and state Board of Nursing for nurse practitioners.
34. Examples of nurse practitioner regulatory statutes (a term of art) include DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 1902 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-1001, -1001(a) (1979) (current version at § 43-
26-1 (1982)); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 457-2 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 1, § 3405 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.17210 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 335.016 (Vernon
Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-8-102(3)(a) (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4723.01, -.06
(1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 567.3 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-34-1 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 63-7-2.07(13) (1982); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4513 (Vernon 1982); W. VA.
CODE § 30-7-1 (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 441.01 (West Supp. 1981).
35. See ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 678.375-.390 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.88.030 (Supp.
1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-31.4 to -31.9.1; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 326-B:7 (Supp. 1981);
"where nurse practitioners work 'in collaboration with' rather than 'under the direct supervision
of physicians." Comment, Nurse Practitioner, supra note 22, at 375. See also Rivara, supra note
17, at 105, where the author states that "[tihe Family Nurse Practitioner Council of the American
Nurses Association maintains that the nurse is an independently licensed practitioner, and there-
fore, the relationship between the nurse practitioner and physician should be a collaborative one."
36. Chapman & Record, supra note 3, at 33.
37. H.R. Rep. No. 95-548, Part II, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 9, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4055, 4073.
38. ALA. CODE § 34-21-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 08.68.410(8)(1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32-1601 to -1661 (1956 & Supp. 1972-82); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-746(e), 754(f), -756.1 (1979 &
Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. § 464.012 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 54-1402 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-
23-1-1(c) (Bums 1982); IOWA CODE § 152.1 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1113 (1980); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 314.011 (Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.913 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2102 (1964); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 7-305 to -504 (1981 & Supp.
1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 80B-C (West 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-15-5 (Supp.
1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1, 132.05 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.010 (1979); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 326-B:2 (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.20 (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 43-12.1-05 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 678.375, .380, .385, .390 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 212 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-33-10 (Law Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 36-9A-1 to -12 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-3la-I to -6 (Supp. 1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1572 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 54-367.2 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 18.88.030 (Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. § 33-21-120 (Supp. 1983); see also Trandel-Korenchuk
5
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statutes are simple authorization statutes.39 Consequently, some nurse
practitioners and almost all physician's assistants are liable only as
agents of the hiring institution or physician. Although both the agent
and his principal are liable for the negligent act of the agent new health
professional, the new health professional is often judgment proof.4 °
The principals of the agent new health professionals usually are not.4'
Because the principal, here a physician or hospital, is the one joined
defendant often capable of compensating the plaintiff,42 it is important
to know exactly who the new health professional's principal is at the
time of the alleged malpractice.
Physician's assistants and nurse practitioners practicing under simple
authorization statutes are often the agent of an institution in one in-
stance and the agent of a physician in another instance.43 A general
rule of the law of agency has developed to help determine the principal
for whom the agent new health professional is acting at the time of new
health professional malpractice. The "borrowed servant doctrine"'
states that:
When an employer-the 'general' employer-lends an employee to an-
other employer [and relinquishes to a borrowing employer] all rights of
control over the employee's activities, a 'special employment' relation-
ship arises between the borrowing employer and the employee. During
this period of transferred control, the special employer becomes solely
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the employee's job
related torts.
4 5
The courts have adopted an ad hoc approach in determining whether
the assistant new health professional was a temporary employee, look-
ing to the extent of control by the borrower and the particular function
of the assistant.'
& Trandel-Korenchuk, Current Legal Issues Facing Nursing Practice, 5 NURSING AD. Q. 37
(1980); Kissam, supra note 32, at 25 n.168.
39. See Washington State Nurses Ass'n v. Board of Medical Examiners, 93 Wash. 2d at 119,
605 P.2d at 1271. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 3500-353.5 (West Supp. 1984).
40. See Comment, The Negligent Nurse. Rxfor the Medical Malpractice Victim, 12 TULSA L.
J. 104, 120 n.92 (1976) (where the author describes the low-average salaries of nurses). Nurses also
have a hard time finding adequate malpractice insurance coverage. See id at 125 n.109. The
autonomous nurse practitioner would have at least an equally tough time finding malpractice
insurance coverage. Nurse practitioner average salaries are similar to those of a registered nurse.
(Information acquired through interview with Dr. Mary Mundinger, Director of Graduate Pro-
grams, School of Nursing, Columbia University. (Jan. 1983)).
41. The principals here are either physicians or hospitals.
42. Hospitals and physicians have easy access to medical malpractice insurance coverage.
43. The new health professional employed by a hospital may receive patients in a hospital
emergency room and later assist a particular physician in the operating room.
44. See generally Marsh v. Tilley Steel Co., 26 Cal. 3d 486, 606 P.2d 335, 162 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1980).
45. Id at 492, 606 P.2d at 358-59, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24.
46. See Truhitte v. French Hosp., 128 Cal. App. 3d 332, 347, 180 Cal. Rptr. 152, 159 (1982).
The court here cites Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 661-62, 62 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1936) for
6
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The second factor in the determination of the new health profes-
sional liability question is federal legislation authorizing new health
professional independent practice. The RHCSA authorizes employ-
ment of physician's assistants and nurse practitioners in rural and ur-
ban poor areas at "satellite clinics without onsite physician
supervision."47 Because a physician's assistant practicing under state
simple authorization statutes48 must have a supervising physician or
institution,49 the RHCSA has effectively reduced the supervision re-
quirement for physician assistant practice. Nurse practitioners practic-
ing under similar state simple authorization statutes are also subject to
reduced supervision requirements under the new federal law. These
previously supervised new health professionals approach autonomous
practice under the RHCSA. With this autonomous practice comes in-
dependent liability.
A final factor in the new health professional agency/autonomy de-
termination is the agent or independent contractor status of similar
health care providers. Health care providers similar to the new health
professionals perform similar medical functions after completing simi-
lar training requirements. For instance, the clinical technician has a
medical function5" and training requirements5' similar to those of a
physician's assistant. A clinical technician practices as an agent of a
medical laboratory. He does his work under the direct supervision of a
laboratory supervisor. The laboratory is liable for the clinical techni-
cian's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.52 A clear
analogy can be drawn from the clinical technician's practice to help
establish physician's assistant practice as that of an agent of a physician
or institution.
An analysis of the nurse practitioner's similar health care providers'
standards of care does not, at first glance, allow for a clear analogy to
be drawn to a nurse practitioner standard of care. One health care pro-
vider similar to the nurse practitioner,53 the nurse anesthetist, practices
the proposition that a "surgeon is not liable as a special employer for negligent acts of a nurse
performed while not under the surgeon's direct supervision and control" (emphasis added). Here
the nurse's unsupervised activity was pre-operation preparation of a patient.
47. Rivara, supra note 17, at 103 (emphasis added).
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 7-16.
50. Both physician's assistants and clinical technicians perform technical primary care.
51. See P. DEDMAN supra note 2, at 222, where the clinical technician program entrance
requirements are described as equal to most state physician's assistant program entrance require-
ments. Physician's assistant program curriculum have more liberal arts classes but the main focus
is on clinical (applied) medicine. See id. at 370 for discussion of the clinical technician training
program.
52. See Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979).
53. Both nurse anesthetists and nurse practitioners are registered nurses with specific further
training.
7
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as an independent contractor.54 The nurse anesthetist posses responsi-
bilities that "lie in an area of expertise in which some physicians re-
ceive full residency training."55  The hospital employs the nurse
anesthetist to perform the specific function of anesthetizing the patient.
Common nurse anesthetist practice is to administer the anesthesia
without the operating surgeon's supervision.56 The operating surgeon
may not be held liable for nurse anesthetist malpractice under the "bor-
rowed servant doctrine"57 because there is no "special employment"58
relationship between the nurse anesthetist and the operating surgeon.
The nurse anesthetist is thus liable for his or her own negligence.
Another health care provider similar to the nurse practitioner, the
registered nurse,5 9 is, as a general rule,6" liable for his or her negligence
as an agent of the hiring physician or institution.6' Registered nurses
are hired to perform ministerial functions 62 for their principals. They
are not practicing autonomously and thus are not independently liable
for their negligence.
The registered nurse, although licensed under the same regulatory
scheme as a nurse practitioner, does not have the advanced training
necessary for autonomous practice. The nurse anesthetist does have
this advanced training and exercises those skills in an autonomous set-
ting. An analogy should be drawn from the nurse anesthetist practice
to help establish nurse practitioners as autonomous when the state au-
thorization statutes allow for such autonomy.
Clearly, the nurse practitioner is potentially the more autonomous of
the two new health professionals analyzed. The nurse practitioner has
the option, under some regulatory statutes, to act independently of di-
rect supervision. The physician's assistant must practice as an agent
under direct supervision, except when practicing in rural or urban poor
areas under the RHCSA. Only then does the physician's assistant prac-
tice approach the autonomy the nurse practitioners exercise under reg-
54. See Whitney v. Day, 100 Mich. App. 707, 709, 300 N.W.2d 380, 382 (1980); Gore v.
United States, 229 F. Supp. 547, 549 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
55. Whitney, 100 Mich. App. at 709, 300 N.W.2d at 382.
56. Gore, 229 F. Supp. at 549.
57. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
58. Id
59. Nurse practitioners are similar to registered nurses in that both must meet basic entry
level licensure requirements, and nurse practitioners are nurses with advanced training.
60. Before the demise of the charitable immunity doctrine, a registered nurse could be held
independently liable for her negligence on a theory that plaintiffs should be compensated for their
injuries by someone. See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
Under the charitable immunity doctrine non-profit hospitals were not subject to tort liability. The
registered nurse was the only defendant who could be held liable for her negligence. See Hallinan
v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62 P.2d 1075 (1936).
61. See Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 303-04, 163 P.2d 860, 863-64
(1945); Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
62. See Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d at 237.
8
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ulatory statutes. With this new health professional autonomy comes
independent liability.
63
III. THE NEW HEALTH PROFESSIONAL STANDARD OF CARE
Once it is determined who is liable for the new health professional
malpractice, it is necessary to establish what standard of care these new
health professionals are to be held in determining their negligence.'
Because the number of practicing new health professionals is small and
their practices are diverse, 65 a clear standard of care has yet to be estab-
lished.6 6 In developing a standard of care three determinations must be
made.
A. Upper and Lower Bounds for New Health Professionals' Standard
of Care
The first step in establishing a standard of care is to set parameters
for the standard. To determine the upper boundary of a new health
professional standard of care, it must be determined whether new
health professionals are in a profession distinct from physicians, and
thus have their own standard of care, or are "surrogates for physicians
and therefore obligated to perform at the level of physician's standard
of care."67 One proposal is to hold these new health professionals to a
physician's standard of care under the theory that they are in fact dis-
pensing medical treatment. As a general rule an individual undertaking
to practice medicine is held to the standard of a physician.68 But,pre-
scribed new health professional practice does not include dispensing
medical treatment .69 They provide diagnostic and therapeutic treat-
ment, not the independent medical judgment a physician provides.7 °
Thus, a new health professional should be held to a physician's stan-
63. Another possibility, one that some courts have mentioned in dicta, is that the new health
professional and his employer may be held jointly and severally liable. See Green v. United
States, 530 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Nixon v. Riverview Hosp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 364,
376, 62 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (1967).
64. This determination is state substantive law. When this question comes up in federal
court, state law applies to the issue of a new health professional standard of care. See generally
Wright v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 147, 151 (E.D. La. 1981).
65. See Comment, Nurse Practitioner, supra note 22, at 381.
66. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
67. Chapman & Record, supra note 3, at 33.
68. See Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 147 (1926).
69. See generally Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 175 Cal. Rptr.
177 (1981). While new health professionals dispense primary care diagnosis and treatment, they
do not exercise independent medical judgment. If a problem requiring medical judgment arises,
the new health professional can either refer the patient to a physician or follow well-defined proto-
cols or algorithms. See Comment, supra note 14, at 66. These protocols are lists, compiled by
physicians, that match patient symptoms with proposed treatment.
70. The physician with his advanced training does not have to rely on protocols or algorithms
when making medical judgments.
9
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dard of care only if he acts outside his prescribed practice.7" Because
these new health professionals have training requirements quite differ-
ent from those of a physician,72 they cannot be considered "surrogates"
for the physician. They are in a profession distinct from physicians and
have their own standard of care, below that of a physician.73
Although it is clear that the new health professional will not ordina-
rily be held to a physician's standard of care, there should be a certain
level of care the new health professional must always provide. This
minimum level of care is set by the health care provider's "duty of
protection."'74 This duty owed by the new health professional assures
the patient adequate health care75 by requiring the health care provider
to "exercise such reasonable care toward a patient as his known condi-
tion may require."76 The California Supreme Court in Rice v. Califor-
nia Lutheran Hospital7 7 stated that the duty must be exercised in
accordance with "the illness of the patient and incidents thereof."78 In
Rice a health care provider was negligent for leaving a cup of hot tea
on the bedside table of a weak, drugged, and hungry elderly woman.
"The jury could have inferred that she would have a craving for the
tea, and would, in a view of the circumstances, underestimate her
strength and ability to handle the hot water."' 79 Thus, the health care
provider was liable for the burn injuries that resulted when the tea
spilled on the patient. He had failed to fulfill his duty to protect the
patient.
The new health professionals' ability to fulfill their duty to protect is
assured through their authorization process. Before a licensed regis-
tered nurse can practice as a nurse practitioner she must complete a
state Board of Education certified nurse practitioner training pro-
71. The new health professionals may be held liable for failing to recognize their practicing
limitations. See Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 736 Cal. App. 2d 224, 288 P.2d 581
(1955).
72. Physician training includes an undergraduate degree as a prerequisite to four years of
medical school and at least three more years of residency training. Not all state new health pro-
fessional training programs require an undergraduate degree as a prerequisite to enrollment.
Once enrolled, the training programs last a maximum of two years.
73. See generally Policheck v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 1261, 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1982), where
the court concluded that physician's assistants have considerably less training than physicians and
cannot be expected to recognize all textbook symptoms. See also Fein, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 160,
175 Cal. Rptr. at 192, where the California court stated that the role of the nurse practitioner and
physician differ. Thus, the jury instruction that a nurse practitioner is to be held to the standard of
a physician was erroneous.
74. See Wood v. Samaritan Inst., 26 Cal. 2d 846, 847, 161 P.2d 556, 557 (1945).
75. See generally Darling v. Charlestown Community Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965).
76. See Wood, 26 Cal. 2d at 851, 161 P.2d at 558.
77. 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945).
78. Id at 302, 163 P.2d at 864.
79. Id
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gram.8" The physician's assistant candidate must complete a similarly
certified physician's assistant training program before she is authorized
to practice as a physician's assistant."' Each state's Board of Education
will assure an adequate training of the new health professionals so that
they may fulfill their duty to protect the patient.
B. National or Similar Community Standard of Care
Once the parameters for a new health professional standard of care
have been established, the next step is to choose between a national or
similar community standard of care. There are three sources to ex-
amine when making this decision. First, one must look to the general
trend in medical malpractice suits. Courts have consistently recognized
two factors in support of a national standard of care for health profes-
sionals.82 For one, health practitioners are becoming nationalized
through a system of national board certification. 3 National board cer-
tified physician specialists, 4 general practitioners,8 5 hospitals, 6 and
clinical technicians87 have all been held to a national standard of care
under this theory. More importantly, the rationale for the similar com-
munity standard of care no longer exists.88 The similar community
standard of care rule was designed to protect rural practitioners who
did not have access to the continuing medical education that practition-
ers have in metropolitan areas.8 9 Present transportation and communi-
cation systems in this country lend support to the conclusion that "any
purposeful disparity between the skills of practitioners in various...
centers has for the most part been eliminated." 90 Without the disparity
between the skills of practitioners from different communities, the simi-
lar community standard of care acts only as a barrier to plaintiff recov-
ery.9' There is no practical logic for its application in medical
malpractice causes of action.
80. See supra note 8.
81. See supra note 7.
82. See Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 564 (D.C. 1979).
83. Id.
84. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (where an obstetrician, nationally
board certified, was held to a national standard of care).
85. See Pederson v. Dumonchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967) (where a general prac-
titioner was held to a national standard of care under the theory that he, along with all other
general practitioners, graduated from an AMA nationally accredited medical school).
86. See Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1980).
87. Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979).
88. Id at 563.
89. Id at 561-62.
90. Id at 563.
91. To establish health practitioner negligence the plaintiff patient must establish a duty
owed to him by the health practitioner. He must then show that this duty was breached. This two
step process often requires the testimony of an expert medical witness. If the medical practitioner
11
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A second determinant in the choice between a national or similar
community standard of care for the new health professional is estab-
lished standards of care for similar health care providers. The clinical
technician, similar to the physician's assistant,92 is held to a national
standard of care.93 The same reasons which justify the application of a
national standard of care to physicians and institutions appear to apply
with equal validity to technicians working in medical laboratories.
94
"The opportunities for keeping abreast of medical advances that are
available to doctors are equally available to [clinical technicians work-
ing in] clinical laboratories."95
The physician's assistant should be held to a national standard of
care like his similar health care provider, the clinical technician. The
physician's assistant may be nationally certified 96 and thus have nation-
alized standards. 97 More importantly, the training of physician's assist-
ants is closely monitored9" and constantly updated.9 9 Consequently,
there should be no disparity of skill among the different communities.
Therefore, the physician's similar community standard of care is inap-
plicable to the physician's assistant."
The nurse practitioner, unlike its similar health care providers,
should be held to a national standard of care. The nurse anesthetist
and registered nurse, similar to the nurse practitioner,' are both held
to a similar community standard of care because they are rarely nation-
ally certified.° 2 Although nurse practitioners usually are not nationally
is held to a similar community standard of care, the medical witness must be from that community
in order to testify about the duty owed (standard of care) in that community.
It is difficult to find an expert who will testify against someone from his same occupation and
community. This phenomenon is known as the "conspiracy of silence." See generally Robbins v.
Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
92. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
93. See Morrison, 407 A.2d at 565.
94. Id
95. Id.
96. Most states do not license physician's assistants to practice. A few states certify physi-
cian's assistants. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3517 (West Supp. 1984). Because most states
have no other form of accreditation, the optional physician's assistant national certification may
become mandatory. See P. DEDMAN, supra note 1, at 370. (This possibility was brought to my
attention through an interview with Dr. Mary Mundinger, Director of Graduate Programs, School
of Nursing, Columbia University (Jan. 1983)).
97. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
98. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3513 (West Supp. 1984).
99. Id
100. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
102. For nurse anesthetists, see Whitney v. Day, 100 Mich. App. 707, 300 N.W.2d 380 (1980);
Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1975).
For registered nurses, see Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 229, 288
P.2d 581 (1955); Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 331, 160 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1979); Thomp-
son v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. La. 1973); Baur v. Mesta Machine, 405 Pa. 617, 176
A.2d 684 (1961).
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certified, 0 3 their training programs offer modem instruction, including
continual clinical work.'04 Because nurse practitioners across the coun-
try have equal access to the medical background pertinent to their pro-
fession, it is not necessary to hold the nurse practitioner to a similar
community standard of care. 05
A final determinant in the national or similar community standard of
care choice is the Restatement Second of Torts,"°6 which states the gen-
eral professional standard of care: "exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good
standing in similar communities."'' 07 The Restatement is inconsistent
with the modem trend in medical malpractice suits. This is not a prob-
lem, because the Restatement is only a guideline, and for the purposes
of this issue, an outdated guideline. The Restatement was last revised
in 1965 when the trend toward a national standard of care for the
health practitioners was only beginning. This trend should be followed
when developing a standard of care for the new health professionals.
C. Flexible vs. Rigid Standard of Care
To adopt the traditional national standard of care0 8 for the new
health professionals would cause inherent inequities in overall new
health professional practice. Nurse practitioners, for example, are cur-
rently employed in small numbers at diverse practices.0 9 Some are
acting autonomously 1 o while others work under the direct supervision
of physicians or institutions,' depending on each nurse practitioner's
particular state authorization statute. Because these nurse practitioners
103. Nurse practitioners are licensed by the state as registered nurses and further trained in
state Board of Education approved programs. There is no state certification for nurse practition-
ers. The national certification available is not necessary because the nurse practitioner has been
accredited through state licensure. National certification shows excellence and allows for inter-
state nurse practitioner mobility. (This information was acquired from Dr. Mary Mundinger,
Director of Graduate Programs, School of Nursing, Columbia University (Jan. 1983)).
104. Id
105. A nurse practitioner similar community standard of care would not only be inconsistent
with the modern trend towards a national standard of care for medical practitioners, but would
almost certainly lead to "a conspiracy of silence" among the medical practitioners in the nurse
practitioner's community. See supra note 91. The nurse practitioners have been used sparingly.
See, Comment, Nurse Practitioner, supra note 22, at 381. The experts capable of testifying against
nurse practitioners advocate the nurse practitioner movement. It is hard to forsee these propo-
nents of the nurse practitioner movement contributing to the potential demise of the nurse practi-
tioner program by holding themselves out as expert witnesses willing to testify against nurse
practitioners in malpractice proceedings.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
107. Id (emphasis added).
108. A traditional national standard of care holds all members of the profession to the same
level of exercised skill and knowledge.
109. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
1ll. Id
13
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are dispensing different levels of primary care a flexible nurse practi-
tioner standard of care is necessary."1 2
The Restatement Second of Torts" 3 offers guidance in establishing a
flexible standard of care. When "different methods are followed by
different groups engaged in a trade, the actor is to be judged by the
professional standards of the group to which he belongs.""t4 The util-
ity of this standard is illustrated in Bauer v. Mesta Machine,"5 a case
involving the negligence of a registered nurse in an industrial dispen-
sary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the registered nurse's
standard of care to be that of a "reasonably prudent registered nurse in
charge of an industrial dispensary."' 6 The nurse was held to a stan-
dard established by other industrial dispensary nurses, not to a stan-
dard established by all diversely practicing registered nurses within the
community. Although this flexible standard of care is a similar com-
munity standard of care for certain registered nurses, it provides the
courts with an equitable national standard of care to which the new
health professionals are held in a negligence cause of action.' '7 The
autonomous new health professionals throughout the nation could set
their own standard of care, independent of the standard set by the non-
autonomous (agent) new health professionals." 8
IV. CONCLUSION
New health professionals have been used sparingly to dispense pri-
mary care in physician deficient areas."I9 Studies indicate that there is
an increased need for their services. 2 ° However, before the new health
professionals can become a main source of primary care, either as
112. This flexible national standard of care is equally applicable to physician's assistants.
They may not need the flexible standard of care. Because physician's assistant authorization legis-
lation is narrow, physician's assistants do not have diverse practices except when practicing
outside direct supervision under the RHCSA. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment f (1965).
114. Id.
115. 405 Pa. 671, 176 A.2d 684 (1961).
116. Id. at 674, 176 A.2d at 688.
117. The Pennsylvania court could only hold the registered nurses to the flexible similar com-
munity standard of care because registered nurses are held to a similar community, not national,
standard of care. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. The same reasons which justify the
application of a flexible similar community standard for registered nurses appear to validate a
flexible national standard for new health professionals. These diversely practicing new health
professionals should not all be held to the same national standard.
118. There will, in practice, be more than just two groups of new health professionals through-
out the nation. For example, not all autonomous nurse practitioners will perform at the same
level of autonomy. Some nurse practitioners will have easy access to physician advice and should
use it. Others will have very limited access to physician advice and will be forced to rely on
protocols and algorithms. See supra note 69.
119. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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agents of an institution or physician or as independent contractors,
their liability and the appropriate standard of care must be determined.
The liability question is answered by agency law. If the new health
professional is not practicing in an agency relationship, he will be liable
for his own torts as an independent contractor. If there is an agency
relationship, the new health professional's principal becomes liable for
the new health professional's torts under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
The standard of care proposed by this Comment allows for great
flexibility in new health professional practice, yet assures the patient an
adequate minimum level of health care and recourse if the new health
professional does not provide this level of care. 2' With a well-defined
new health professional standard of care, physicians, hospitals, and the
new health professionals can make informed decisions on new health
professional practice.
PAUL C. MUNDINGER*
121. The plaintiff patient does not have to face the "conspiracy of silence" inherent in a simi-
lar locality standard of care. See supra note 91.
* Class of 1984, University of San Diego School of Law.
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